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The measurement of implicit or unconscious motives using the picture story exercise (PSE) has long been
a target of debate in the psychological literature. Most debates have centered on the apparent paradox that
PSE measures of implicit motives typically show low internal consistency reliability on common indices
like Cronbach’s alpha but nevertheless predict behavioral outcomes. I describe a dynamic Thurstonian
item response theory (IRT) model that builds on dynamic system theories of motivation, theorizing on
the PSE response process, and recent advancements in Thurstonian IRT modeling of choice data. To
assess the models’ capability to explain the internal consistency paradox, I first fitted the model to
archival data (Gurin, Veroff, & Feld, 1957) and then simulated data based on bias-corrected model
estimates from the real data. Simulation results revealed that the average squared correlation reliability
for the motives in the Thurstonian IRT model was .74 and that Cronbach’s alpha values were similar to
the real data (.35). These findings suggest that PSE motive measures have long been reliable and
increase the scientific value of extant evidence from motivational research using PSE motive measures.
Keywords: implicit motives, reliability, Thematic Apperception Test, choice model, psychometric
Psychologists have long been interested in implicit and uncon-
scious motives (McClelland, Koestner, & Weinberger, 1989;
Westen, 1998; Winter, John, Stewart, Klohnen, & Duncan, 1998)
and their measurement using the picture story exercise (PSE). The
PSE consists of a series of drawn pictures showing people in daily
situations and a series of questions asking respondents to write
stories describing what is happening in each of the pictures.
Responses are typically scored by trained raters on the basis of
elaborate scoring manuals (McClelland et al., 1989; Schultheiss &
Pang, 2007). The PSE derives some of its principles from Morgan
and Murray’s (1935) Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), which is
why some researchers have also used the term TAT to refer to the
PSE.
The field has long been divided between proponents and critics
of the PSE (e.g., Entwisle, 1972; Fineman, 1977; Lilienfeld,
Wood, & Garb, 2000; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Woike, 2001;
Woike & McAdams, 2001). Most debates between proponents and
critics of the PSE are related to an apparent psychometric paradox
of PSE motive measures. This paradox lies in the fact that PSE
measures typically show low internal consistency reliability but
predict behavior as well as questionnaire measures (Spangler,
1992).1
Internal consistency reliability estimates for motive scores from
PSE measures are typically between .10 and .40 (e.g., Entwisle,
1972; Fineman, 1977; Schultheiss, Liening, & Schad, 2008; Tu-
erlinckx, De Boeck, & Lens, 2002; also see the Previous Research
on the Reliability of the PSE section and the empirical study in this
article). Based on these findings, critics have argued that the
usefulness of PSE motive measures is limited because scores
largely consist of measurement error (Entwisle, 1972; Fineman,
1977; Lilienfeld et al., 2000). However, the notion that PSE
measures of the power, the affiliation, and the achievement mo-
tives largely consist of measurement error is difficult to conciliate
with the fact that PSE measures typically show correlations with
relevant behavioral outcomes that are in the range of or even
higher than for questionnaire measures (Spangler, 1992) and ex-
plain unique variance in criteria (e.g., Brunstein & Maier, 2005;
Winter et al., 1998).
Proponents of PSE motive measures have pointed to this evi-
dence and have argued against the notion that PSE motive scores
largely consist of measurement error (Atkinson, Bongort, & Price,
1977; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Winter et al., 1998; Woike, 2001;
Woike & McAdams, 2001). Researchers have also suggested that
the low internal consistency reliability estimates that cause the
internal consistency reliability paradox of PSE measures are the
result of special types of response processes (Atkinson & Birch,
1970; Atkinson et al., 1977; Schultheiss et al., 2008) and that these
1 The reliability of the predictor (rxx) is a boundary for observed
criterion-related validity, rˆxy rxxryy (see, e.g., Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994, p. 241).
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special types of response processes do not imply poor validity.
Furthermore, they have proposed that traditional psychometric
models and traditional measures of internal consistency reliability
areinternal consistency not able to adequately capture these special
response mechanisms (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Atkinson et al.,
1977; Schultheiss et al., 2008; Winter & Stewart, 1977; Winter et
al., 1998).
In this article, I build on these theoretical ideas and suggest that
the classic PSE and its response process can be modeled such that
motive scores from a PSE session show evidence of reliability.
This article builds on dynamic system theories of motivation
(Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Murray, 1938;
Revelle, 1986) and earlier theorizing on the PSE response process
(Tuerlinckx et al., 2002). I extend this earlier work by integrating
it with recent advancement in the modeling of choice data with
Thurstonian models (Böckenholt, 2004, 2006; Brown & Maydeu-
Olivares, 2011, 2013; McFadden, 2001) and recent applications of
these advanced Thurstonian models in the context of forced-choice
personality questionnaires (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011) and
motivational research (Böckenholt, 2004; Eggerth, 2004; Lang,
Zettler, Ewen, & Hülsheger, 2012). My core theoretical argument
is that an implicit multivariate choice process whereby the tenden-
cies to express different implicit motives (achievement, affiliation,
and power) in behavior compete with each other and with the
tendency to write stories on other story content underlies responses
in the classic PSE. I propose that individual differences in this
choice process between persons and dynamic fluctuations in this
choice process are systematic and can be modeled using dynamic
Thurstonian IRT models such that motive scores from a PSE
session show evidence of reliability. In essence, the suggested
dynamic Thurstonian modeling approach is a psychometric repre-
sentation of theoretical ideas that have been discussed in the
motivational literature to theoretically understand motive expres-
sion in the PSE and the PSE reliability paradox (Atkinson & Birch,
1970; Atkinson et al., 1977; Murray, 1938).
I begin this article by reviewing previous research on the reli-
ability of the PSE and extant theories and psychometric models of
the PSE response process. Based on this earlier work, I then
describe the theoretical and statistical rationales for the proposed
dynamic Thurstonian IRT model. I finally evaluate this model by
reanalyzing a classic data set on the PSE containing stories for six
PSE pictures (Gurin, Veroff, & Feld, 1957, 1960) and by studying
the squared correlation reliability of the model in simulated data
(cf. Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011).
Implicit Motives and the Picture Story Exercise
Implicit motives are typically described as “people’s wishes and
desires” (Winter et al., 1998, p. 231) or as “the disposition to be
concerned with and to strive for a certain class of incentives or
goals” (Winter et al., 1998, p. 232; see also Emmons, 1989). The
PSE procedure asks respondents to spontaneously generate imag-
inative stories in response to ambiguous pictures (McClelland et
al., 1989; Winter et al., 1998). For instance, a picture may show a
couple at home, and respondents are asked to write a story an-
swering the following questions: (a) Who are the persons and what
do they do? (b) What happened before the situation? (c) What do
the persons want and how do they feel? (d) What is eventually
going to happen? (See Gurin et al., 1957.) The stories that respon-
dents write are subsequently scored for motive content by trained
experts on the basis of a validated scoring manual. In so doing, the
trained experts mark every response or thought in each story that
entails a motive of interest. Most researchers focus on scoring
three major implicit motives: the achievement motive, the affilia-
tion motive, and the power motive (Kehr, 2004; McClelland et al.,
1989).
Implicit motives measured by the PSE are thought to be implicit
in the sense that responses are frequently not directly accessible to
awareness either because their content is entailed in idealized
self-conceptions or because people defend against knowledge of
their implicit motives (McClelland et al., 1989; Winter et al.,
1998). In line with this idea, PSE scores do not show notable
correlation with questionnaire measures even when both measures
target the same theoretical construct, and personality researchers
have therefore argued that implicit motives form a distinct cate-
gory of personality characteristics that is not accessible using
questionnaires (Brunstein & Maier, 2005; McClelland et al., 1989;
Spangler, 1992; Winter et al., 1998).
Previous Research on the Reliability of the PSE
Reliability can be defined as the squared correlation between
test scores and true scores, as the ratio of true score variance to
observed score variance, or as the product–moment correlation
between two parallel tests with the same psychometric properties
executed under the same circumstances (e.g., Lord & Novick,
1968; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Sijtsma, 2009, 2012). In PSE
research, researchers are typically interested in two distinct types
of reliability information.
Reliability of the Coding Process
One type of reliability information pertains to the coding pro-
cess (Entwisle, 1972; Lilienfeld et al., 2000; Mitchell, 1979;
Schultheiss et al., 2008). Research on the reliability of the coding
process focuses either on raters or on the subcategories of coding
systems, and the goal is to determine the degree to which different
raters and different scoring categories yield comparable results
when they are used to evaluate the same (recorded) behavior.
Research suggests that raters who rate the same PSE stories show
high levels of interrater reliability using most PSE scoring systems
(i.e., correlations between overall scores of raters or intraclass
correlation coefficients; see Brunstein & Heckhausen, 2008; Lil-
ienfeld et al., 2000; Schultheiss et al., 2008; Schultheiss & Pang,
2007; Veroff, Atkinson, Feld, & Gurin, 1960). Studies on the
reliability of scoring systems also show evidence for intrarater
reliability across different categories within PSE scoring systems
(Brunstein & Heckhausen, 2008; Gruber & Kreuzpointer, 2013;
Kuhl, 1978). The findings on the PSE coding process consequently
provide evidence that the coding process is successful in consis-
tently identifying motive content in PSE stories.
Reliability of Motive Scores
A different type of reliability information in PSE data—the
focus of this article—is the reliability of the motive-expression
behavior of the respondents and the degree to which a PSE is
capable of reliably measuring individual differences in this behav-
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ior (e.g., Entwisle, 1972; Lilienfeld et al., 2000; Mitchell, 1979;
Schultheiss et al., 2008). This reliability information is conceptu-
ally analogous to reliability for questionnaire measures or intelli-
gence tests. The underlying question is, To what degree would
scores be replicable when persons would work on a different (but
equivalent parallel) set of pictures under the same circumstances?
To answer this question, PSE researchers have used two research
strategies.
The first research strategy uses internal consistency reliability
coefficients to estimate the reliability of PSE motive scores on the
basis of one PSE administration. The goal is to allow inferences on
the reliability of PSE measures by studying the consistency of
individual differences in motive-expression behavior across pic-
tures in one PSE session (e.g., Entwisle, 1972; Fineman, 1977;
Lilienfeld et al., 2000; Mitchell, 1979). Research of this type has
typically relied on Cronbach’s alpha as an index of internal con-
sistency reliability and has typically revealed alpha values between
.10 and .40 (Entwisle, 1972; Tuerlinckx et al., 2002). Cronbach’s
alpha has known limitations as a measure of internal consistency
reliability (Bentler, 2009; Revelle & Zinbarg, 2009; Sijtsma, 2009,
2012). However, improved indices based on modern conceptual-
izations of internal consistency reliability (Bentler, 2009; Revelle
& Zinbarg, 2009) like the greatest lower bound (Woodhouse &
Jackson, 1977) also yield estimates for motive scores from PSE
measures that are only slightly higher (see Gruber & Kreuzpointer,
2013, and the empirical study later in this article). These estimates
are typically still far below recommended minimum levels of
reliability of .70 (Smith, McCarthy, & Anderson, 2000). The
findings on the internal consistency reliability of PSE measures
consequently suggest that PSE motive scores either have low
internal consistency reliability or, alternatively, that a more com-
plex psychometric model is required to capture the true response
process in PSE measures.
A second strategy used in research on the reliability of motive-
expression behavior in PSE measures is to calculate test–retest
correlations by asking respondents to work on a PSE measure
twice (typically a week to several months apart). One important
observation from retest studies is that test–retest correlations for
PSE measures are typically higher than their internal consistency
estimates (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007; Winter & Stewart, 1977).
Another relevant finding from retest research is that PSE measure
show within-person or profile stability—respondents write similar-
themed stories to the same pictures in retest sessions (Busch &
Hofer, 2012; Schultheiss et al., 2008). The findings from retest
research are encouraging in the sense that they show that PSE
measures do measure something that is stable. A limitation of
test–retest correlations as measures of reliability, however, is that
high test–retest correlations only provide evidence of high reliabil-
ity when certain conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are that
the retest functions like an equivalent parallel test and that the
construct of interest is stable over time (Nunnally & Bernstein,
1994; Sijtsma, 2012). Under these conditions, the correlation be-
tween the test and the retest approximately estimates the variance
that the test scores share with the true score (the reliability). When
these conditions are not approximately met, test–retest correlations
can nevertheless be high. This situation especially occurs when a
test measures construct-irrelevant variance that is stable (see Nun-
nally & Bernstein, 1994, p. 243). For instance, three unrelated
questionnaire items asking persons for their age, eye color, and
height likely do not measure a common construct but are all highly
stable such that a composite of these three items would show high
test–retest correlations. Researchers therefore typically suggest
that high internal consistency estimates or, alternatively, a well-
fitting psychometric model that explains the majority of the vari-
ance in the response process is required in addition to test–retest
correlations before researchers can conclude that a test is a reliable
measure of a stable construct (e.g., Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994;
Sijtsma, 2012).
Dynamic System Theories, Motivational Conflict, and
Consummatory Strength
Several motivational models have suggested that it is frequently
convenient to employ the metaphor of a dynamic system to un-
derstand how motivation influences human behavior (Atkinson &
Birch, 1970; Atkinson et al., 1977; Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2002;
Kuhl & Blankenship. 1979; Murray, 1938; Revelle, 1986; Revelle
& Michaels, 1976). A dynamic system consists of a large number
of different forces that operate within the system and on the system
and that change over time. A classic way to represent such a
dynamic system is to use several lines that represent changes in the
tendency to express motives in behavior over time (e.g., Atkinson
et al., 1977; Carver & Scheier, 1998). The first panel of Figure 1
shows such a system with three motives and how the tendency to
express these motives in behavior changes over time. Changes in
the tendency to express a motive can be reactions to external
forces. For instance, the tendency to express a motive may get
aroused by a motive-related cue in a PSE picture.
Figure 1. Hypothetical changes in the tendency to express motives for a
hypothetical person as a result of motive arousal through picture story
exercise (PSE) pictures (Panel A) and the resulting PSE response pattern
(Panel B). This figure is based on the format of similar graphs in Carver
and Scheier (1998, 2002) and Atkinson, Bongort, and Price (1977).
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483ITEM RESPONSE THEORY OF THE PICTURE STORY EXERCISE
An important idea in many motivational models that build on
the dynamic system metaphor is the idea of competition or conflict
between behavioral tendencies (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Atkinson
et al., 1977; Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2002; Murray, 1938; Revelle,
1986). The notion of motivational conflict is closely related to the
system aspect of the dynamic system theories. When competition
exists, several behavioral tendencies can be active in a system, but
only one tendency is typically expressed in behavior and super-
sedes the others. Consequently, the likelihood of a motive response
depends not only on the tendency to express the motive of interest
in behavior but also on the current strength of other behavioral
tendencies in the system. For instance, the likelihood that a person
expresses the achievement motive in behavior will be higher when
the tendencies to express the affiliation motive and the power
motive are low than when these tendencies are high. Atkinson and
Birch (1970) suggested that the reason is that the motives in the system
compete with each other and change over time. Revelle (1986, 2012)
showed that a simpler model in which not the motives but behav-
ioral responses evoked by the motives compete with each other
leads to similar behavioral predictions.
Another important theoretical idea in dynamic system models is
the assumption of consummatory strength (Atkinson & Birch,
1970; Atkinson et al., 1977; Revelle, 1986; Tuerlinckx et al.,
2002). Consummatory strength represents the dynamic aspect
within the dynamic system metaphor. When consummatory
strength is present in a system, expressing a particular motive in
behavior reduces the subsequent likelihood that the motive is
expressed—the motive gets satisfied. Motivated behavior conse-
quently has a refractory period. A result of a motive getting
satisfied is that a motive-related response becomes less likely. This
process occurs with some inertia because acting out a motive
entails a series of successive states of execution before the motive
is actually reduced in its strength (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; At-
kinson et al., 1977).
The combination of the idea of consummatory strength with the
notion of competition between behavioral tendencies to express
motives in the context of dynamic system theories of motivation
leads to additional theoretical predictions. One important predic-
tion is that the expression of a particular motive in behavior not
only reduces the likelihood of its subsequent expression but also
makes responses for the other motives more likely. This mecha-
nism typically leads to behavioral patterns whereby individuals
switch between expressions of different motives in behavior. This
type of switching between motivational expressions especially
occurs when the motives in the system have a comparable strength.
An important source of inspiration for the development of
dynamic system theories has been observations in PSE data (At-
kinson & Birch, 1970; Atkinson et al., 1977; Murray, 1938). In the
PSE, pictures typically lead to a series of different stories. These
stories commonly focus on one (less commonly, two) overarching
motivational themes and differ across pictures. Figure 1B shows
how three PSE pictures could have led to the motivational pattern
shown in Figure 1A. Figure 1B also shows a series of PSE
responses that are most likely to occur as a result of the motiva-
tional changes in Figure 1A when the ideas of competition and
consummatory strength apply. Figure 1 also illustrates why dy-
namic system theories have the potential to provide a psychometric
explanation of the reliability paradox. Classic measures of reliabil-
ity like Cronbach’s alpha expect that items are correlated. Figure
1 illustrates that the behavioral expression of a particular motive in
dynamic system theories of motivation is determined not only by
the motivational content of the picture for this motive but also by
other variables in the system that classic measures of reliability
like Cronbach’s alpha do not take into account (or control for): the
other motives and the history of expression of the other motives in
the system. Dynamic system theories consequently provide a the-
oretical explanation for the reliability paradox. However, these
theoretical ideas have rarely been investigated in actual PSE data.
One study (Reuman, 1982) built on the idea of competition and
investigated the hypothesis that PSE achievement scores could
show predictive validity even when the variability in achievement
imaginary across pictures is high (and Cronbach’s alpha conse-
quently low). Reuman (1982) contrasted groups showing high
variability in achievement imaginary across pictures (and conse-
quently low Cronbach’s alpha) from groups showing low variabil-
ity (and consequently higher Cronbach’s alpha). The results sug-
gested that achievement scores in the high-variability groups (with
lower Cronbach’s alpha) were frequently more predictive of
achievement-related outcome criteria and were consequently in
line with the idea that high Cronbach’s alpha is not a prerequisite
for predictive validity.
Another empirical investigation of theoretical principles from
dynamic system theories was conducted by Tuerlinckx et al.
(2002). Tuerlinckx et al. showed how consummatory strength
principles for a single motive can be modeled using psychometric
methods. Their psychometric study did not find empirical support
for the idea that an achievement response in a picture reduces the
likelihood of another achievement response in the following pic-
ture and consequently suggests that modeling consummatory
strength for a single motive cannot explain the reliability paradox.
I provide a more detailed review of their psychometric study in the
next section.
Previous Psychometric Models of the PSE
Earlier psychometric research on the classic PSE focused on
three psychometric models. In this section, I review this earlier
work and how and to what degree these models incorporate the
notions of motivational competition and consummatory strength
from dynamic system theories because they provide the basis for
the psychometric approach I subsequently suggest for the analysis
of classic PSE data.
The first model is the Rasch model. Kuhl (1978) and Tuerlinckx
et al. (2002) used the basic unidimensional Rasch model (Embret-
son & Reise, 2000) to investigate achievement imaginary in the
PSE. Applied to the PSE, the Rasch model is a basic apperception
theory in which the implicit motive of persons (s) and the insti-
gating force of pictures (g) determine the tendency to write a
story that contains the motive of interest. The instigating force of
pictures is allowed to vary across pictures (some pictures have
more force than others). For person s, the tendency to write a story
with motive-related imaginary on picture g, labeled Tsg, is conse-
quently
Tsgsg. (1)
Because the outcome is binary (a story is either written or not),
the tendency to express the given motive in a story needs to be
linked to the dichotomous outcome using a link function for binary
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data (Embretson & Reise, 2000). The Rasch model uses the
logistic function such that the probability that person s writes a
motive-related story on picture g is
Pr(ysg 1)
exp(Tsg)
1 exp(Tsg)
. (2)
Instead of the logistic function, the model can also be used with
other link functions. One link function that is popular in the item
response theory (IRT) literature is the normal ogive function.
Using the normal ogive function, the probability is
Pr(ysg 1)(Tsg), (3)
where (●) is a short form of the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. The standard normal cumulative distribution
and the logistic function become almost identical when a scaling
parameter (1.72) is added to the logistic function (Embretson &
Reise, 2000).
Psychometric studies using achievement responses to PSE pic-
tures and the Rasch model have provided limited support for this
model as an adequate representation of the PSE response process
(Kuhl, 1978; Tuerlinckx et al., 2002). This finding is not surprising
because a test that works like the Rasch model suggests would
typically also show high Cronbach’s alpha (Embretson & Reise,
2000).
A second model that has been proposed in the psychometric
literature on the PSE is the dynamic apperception model (Tuer-
linckx et al., 2002). This model seeks to extend the Rasch model
by incorporating the idea of consummatory strength from dynamic
system theories (e.g., Atkinson & Birch, 1970). Applied to the
Rasch model for the PSE, the idea of consummatory strength
means that a motive response for a particular motive (e.g., power)
on Picture 1 of a PSE reduces the probability that the story in
response to subsequent Picture 2 will also contain motive content
for the same motive (i.e., is also a power-related story). Tuerlinckx
et al. (2002) suggested modeling this idea using an interaction
parameter, g(g-1), that captures the degree to which a motive
response in the previous picture changes the instigating force in the
subsequent picture (g) such that the Rasch model is extended as
follows:
Tsgsgg(g1). (4)
Tuerlinckx et al. (2002) found that the dynamic apperception
model did not provide a better fit to achievement responses to PSE
pictures than the simple Rasch model.
The third model proposed in the psychometric literature on the
PSE is the stochastic dropout model. The model assumes that the
PSE response process is characterized by an on–off pattern in
which the motive of interest randomly either gets activated or not.
The model consequently assumes that persons either engage in
motive-related story-writing for a particular motive or not (the
person drops out). Only when the person writes a motive-related
story does the Rasch model apply. The random dropout process is
captured by a dropout-parameter g that determines the probability
that respondents do not drop out such that the basic Rasch model
extends to
Pr(ysg 1)g
exp(sg)
1 exp(sg)
. (5)
The normal ogive version of the Rasch model can be extended
in a similar manner to fit the stochastic dropout model with a
normal ogive function. In the psychometric study of Tuerlinckx et
al. (2002), the stochastic dropout model provided the best fit to
data on PSE achievement responses. However, also for this model,
simulated reliability estimates were below .40.
The stochastic dropout model incorporates the idea of motiva-
tional conflict on a basic level as the notion of motivational
conflict suggests that a motive may be active but may be super-
seded by other motives such that it is not expressed in behavior. A
limitation of the stochastic dropout model, however, is the fact that
the model does not seek to model and explain why a dropout
occurs. The Thurstonian IRT model that I subsequently suggest in
this article seeks to address this limitation.
Modified PSE Measures
Psychometric work on the classic PSE, especially the study
conducted by Tuerlinckx et al. (2002), has led to the notion that
several features of the classic PSE are not optimal from a psycho-
metric perspective. In response, motivational researchers have
developed modified versions of the classic PSE that seek to ad-
dress these alleged limitations by increasing the number of pictures
(Blankenship et al., 2006; Scheffer, Kuhl, & Eichstaedt, 2003),
standardizing the response process (Blankenship et al., 2006;
Scheffer et al., 2003), scoring the answers to each question instead
of the answers to pictures (Blankenship & Zoota, 1998; Heck-
hausen, 1963), or maximizing the arousal potential of pictures for
a specific motive (Blankenship et al., 2006). This work has led to
measures that show considerable amounts of internal consistency
or latent-variable reliability during one administration (Blanken-
ship et al., 2006; Blankenship & Zoota, 1998; Heckhausen, 1963;
Lang et al., 2012; Scheffer et al., 2003).
In this article, I suggest not only that modified PSE procedures
can yield reliable scores but that the classic PSE and its response
process can be modeled such that scores from a typical PSE
session show evidence of reliability. This contribution may ad-
vance motivational research because most research on implicit
motives has been conducted using classic PSE measures and
because some modifications of the PSE may potentially alter the
nature of the measured constructs. For instance, researchers have
suggested that PSE pictures need to be ambiguous and need to
arouse more than one motive in order to function effectively as a
measurement instrument (Pang, 2010; Ramsay & Pang, 2013;
Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). In line with this idea, an empirical
study found that using nonambiguous pictures targeting a specific
motive can reduce the test–retest reliability and the predictive
validity for this motive (Ramsay & Pang, 2013).
Thurstonian and Dynamic IRT Modeling Approaches
for the PSE
Thurstonian models, also known as random utility models in
economics, have been used to account for a broad range of seem-
ingly inconsistent choice behavior in psychology (Böckenholt,
2006) and economics (McFadden, 2001). Modern Thurstonian
models can account for individual differences in choice processes
and have recently been used to model individual differences in the
context of personality psychology such as individual differences in
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forced-choice personality questionnaires (Brown & Maydeu-
Olivares, 2011), motivational value choices (Böckenholt, 2004),
modern motive measures (Lang et al., 2012), or interests (Eggerth,
2004).
The dynamic Thurstonian modeling approach for the classic
PSE that I propose in this research includes three core elements:
(a) a multivariate choice process between the choice to express one
of three motives in behavior (achievement, affiliation, and power)
and a choice option for other story content to model motivational
competition, (b) dynamic effects of consummatory strength, and
(c) picture-specific differences in the likelihood that a person
expresses achievement, affiliation, and power imaginary in behav-
ior. The models build on the earlier research on the PSE response
process that I have reviewed in the previous sections in two
important ways.
One way in which the proposed dynamic Thurstonian IRT
approach builds on earlier research is by adopting the notion from
the dropout model (Tuerlinckx et al., 2002) that a motive response
to a specific picture does not always occur with the same likeli-
hood. However, in contrast to the dropout model, I suggest that the
on–off process is not a fully random process and can largely be
explained by the notion of motivational conflict from dynamic
system theories. Motives consequently systematically drop out
because of the activation of the other motives of a person such that
motives compete for activation in a systematic process. A higher
score on one motive than on another motive leads to a higher
chance of expressing the first motive and not expressing the other.
The second way in which the proposed dynamic Thurstonian
IRT approach builds on previous work by Tuerlinckx et al. (2002)
is by modeling the notion of dynamic activation of motives from
dynamic system theories (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Atkinson et al.,
1977; Carver & Scheier, 1998) using dynamic IRT approaches (De
Boeck et al., 2011; Tuerlinckx et al., 2002; Verguts & De Boeck,
2000; Verhelst & Glas, 1993). I use a dynamic model with a
temporary mechanism whereby the motives return to normal acti-
vation after one picture (cf. Tuerlinckx et al., 2002) and a dynamic
model in which motives do not quickly recover and consummatory
strength is sustained for a longer period of time (cf. De Boeck et
al., 2011; Verguts & De Boeck, 2000; Verhelst & Glas, 1993).
Background: Modeling Individual Differences in
Choice Using Thurstonian Models
Thurstonian models (Böckenholt, 2001, 2004, 2006; Brown &
Maydeu-Olivares, 2011, 2013) were originally designed to deter-
mine the standing of choice options on a utility scale based on
incomplete and/or partial ranking data and are now more broadly
used for all types of pairwise comparison data. The Thurstonian
modeling approach is fundamentally based on Thurstone’s (1927)
original theoretical framework for comparison data and accompa-
nying methodology. This framework builds on a set of theoretical
assumptions. The first assumption is that each choice option in a
series of pairwise comparisons elicits a latent utility. The second
assumption is that respondents choose the choice option with the
largest utility when they are asked to choose between options. The
third assumption is that the utilities are unobserved (continuous)
variables that are normally distributed in the population of respon-
dents.
Thurstone’s original framework has been extended by several
researchers in order to allow for individual differences in the
pairwise comparison process, effectively transforming them to
psychometric models that have many common elements with IRT
models. Thurstonian IRT models have opened up a large number
of new applications for pairwise comparison models. One promi-
nent new application is the use of Thurstonian IRT models for
modeling the forced-choice processes in forced-choice question-
naires where respondents are asked to select only items or state-
ments that most apply to them out of a set of statements. The use
of Thurstonian IRT models in this context only requires research-
ers to add the theoretical assumption that the utility of a choice
option (an item in this context) is a linear function of a latent trait
(Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011). The use of Thurstonian mod-
els for modeling PSE data is conceptually analogous to the use of
Thurstonian models for modeling forced-choice personality data
and consequently also requires this assumption. On a conceptual
level, latent motive scores from Thurstonian IRT models for the
PSE indicate to what degree a specific type of motivated behavior
is chosen relative to other behavior.
Information From Recoding Responses to PSE
Pictures Into Pairwise Comparisons
To apply Thurstonian approaches to PSE data, the motivational
content of each PSE story needs to be recoded into pairwise
comparisons of the behavioral choices of interest. Throughout this
article, I focus my theoretical discussion and my empirical analysis
on the three major motives studied in the motivational literature
(achievement, affiliation, and power). The model consequently
includes choice options indicating that one of these three motives
of interest has been expressed in a story. In addition to choice
options for achievement, affiliation, and power behavior, it is
relevant to include an other-content choice option as the fourth
choice option that captures story content not coded as
achievement-related, affiliation-related, or power-related. The pro-
posed approach can in principle be extended to account not only
for achievement, affiliation, and power but also for a larger num-
ber of motives. For the sake of conceptual simplicity and concep-
tual clarity, I restrict my discussion in this article to these three
major motives.
There are two basic approaches for coding PSE data for statis-
tical analyses (e.g., Tuerlinckx et al., 2002). The first approach—
the picture-scoring approach—is to only score whether a story
contains a motive (i.e., Picture 1 elicited a power story, 1, or not,
0). A second approach—the response-scoring approach—is to
consider the scoring of each motive-related response in a story.
The response-scoring approach can lead to more than one response
for each motive in each story (e.g., Picture 1 yields seven power
and three achievement responses). The response-scoring approach
therefore yields more psychometric information. A problem of the
response-scoring approach, however, has frequently been that re-
searchers may need to correct raw scores (sum of motive-related
responses) for the number of responses as the length of stories
differs between persons. In the suggested Thurstonian approach
and other IRT models, varying numbers of responses do not need
to be corrected as IRT models use the available information from
the response patterns to predict where on the underlying latent
variables a person stands. Because of the advantage of having
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more psychometric information and the fact that Thurstonian mod-
els do not require corrections for text length, I use the response-
scoring approach throughout this article.
Thurstonian models are typically applied to paired comparison
data. In a complete paired comparison sequence, participants are
presented sequentially with pairs of all possible choice options and
are asked to choose the preferred choice option for each pair
(Böckenholt, 2001). Four categories yield a total of six pairwise
comparisons. Another frequently used approach is to apply Thur-
stonian models to ranking data. A ranking sequence of choice
options (e.g., A, C, B, D) can be recoded into pairwise compari-
sons, and consequently, Thurstonian models can be fitted in a
similar manner as on paired comparison data. One difference
between the ranking and the paired comparison data formats is that
intransitive choices (i.e., A is preferred over B, C is preferred over
A, but B is preferred over C) are not possible within a ranking
sequence. The ranking format is very flexible and can also be
applied when only a partial ranking sequence is provided. The
ranking information then only provides information on a subset of
all possible pairwise comparisons (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares,
2011).
From the perspective of Thurstonian modeling, PSE data can be
viewed as partial ranking data. In responding to PSE pictures,
respondents provide several thoughts in response to each picture.
Each motive-related thought provides response information on a
total of three pairwise comparisons out of the six possible ones.
For instance, a power-related response indicates that power-related
content dominated over achievement, affiliation, and other content
(pairwise comparisons: power behavior vs. achievement behavior,
power behavior vs. affiliation behavior, power behavior vs. other)
but does not provide information on comparisons between affili-
ation behavior and achievement behavior, achievement behavior
and other content, and affiliation behavior and other content.
Likewise, an achievement-related thought provides information on
all achievement-related comparisons but not on the other compar-
isons. Table 1 illustrates both examples. The missing information
in this type of data structure is not necessarily a problem for the
estimation of the model because each participant responds to
several pictures and may provide several responses to each picture
such that a considerable amount of data is available for each
respondent. As noted previously, it is also not a problem when the
number of responses varies between persons as the Thurstonian
model seeks to determine to what degree people prefer to express
power-related behavior over other content, achievement-related
behavior over other responses, and so on.
Statistical Model
Thurstonian approaches for choice data that can account for
individual differences build on either structural equation method-
ology (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011) or multilevel mixed-
effects models (Böckenholt, 2004, 2006). I use the mixed-effects
approach because the long format used by multilevel mixed-effects
software can more readily deal with the occurrence of missing or
unbalanced numbers of pairwise comparisons for individual re-
sponses (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002) that is a natural consequence of
the response format of PSE measures.
Applied to a series of PSE responses, the mixed-effects pairwise
comparison model consists of two elements: a basic (Level 1)
specification that is similar to applications of pairwise comparison
models that do not differentiate between persons/judges (e.g.,
Critchlow & Fligner, 1991) and a Level 2 component that differ-
entiates between the nature of the judgment situations (e.g., dif-
ferences between pictures) and different persons (or judges in the
original use of the model, see Böckenholt, 2001).
Level 1 specification. The basic idea in Thurstonian models is
that persons determine their choice in pairwise comparisons by
first determining the underlying values of the two items under
consideration and then selecting the item with the higher utility
value. Applied to the PSE, this means that a person has a tendency
to generate motive-related story content that is most strongly
aroused by the picture material. For instance, let is and js denote
the mean evaluations of motive-related behavior i and j by person
s. The latent judgment outcome ijs between these two different
behavioral choices is then a difference between the strengths of the
utility of the two motive-related behaviors:
	ijs
is  
js. (6)
In a manner similar to the IRT models discussed previously, the
latent judgment outcome ijs needs to be mapped to the dichoto-
mous outcome (an i or a j response is written). In Thurstonian
models, this is achieved using the standard normal or normal ogive
function as in ogive IRT models such that
Pr(	ijs 1)
is
jsij , (7)
where (●) is the short form of the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. Alternatively, the model can also be fitted
using a logistic instead of a normal ogive link function (Böcken-
holt, 2001, 2004). In this case, the model is not a Thurstonian
Table 1
Information From Recoding Responses to Picture Story Exercise Pictures Into
Pairwise Comparisons
Pairwise comparison
information
Content of the response
Achievement Affiliation Power Other
Achievement vs. affiliation 1 0 Missing Missing
Achievement vs. power 1 Missing 0 Missing
Achievement vs. other 1 Missing Missing 0
Affiliation vs. power Missing 1 0 Missing
Affiliation vs. other Missing 1 Missing 0
Power vs. other Missing Missing 1 0
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487ITEM RESPONSE THEORY OF THE PICTURE STORY EXERCISE
model in the narrow sense and is also known as the Bradley-Terry-
Luce model (Böckenholt, 2004; also see Critchlow & Fligner,
1991).
When more than two behavioral choices are involved, Equation
1 can be written as a linear model. Let is, js, ks, and ls denote
the mean evaluation of categories i, j, k, and l by person s. The
latent judgment outcomes that each of these behavioral choices is
preferred over the others by person s—ijs, iks, ils, jks, jls, and
kls—are then a function of the difference between the mean
evaluations for these behavioral choices such that

	ijs
	iks
	ils
	jks
	jls
	kls


is
js

is
ks

js
ls

js
ks

js
ls

ks
ls

1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1

is
js
ks
ls
Ds, (8)
where D is the design matrix and s is the corresponding vector of
the mean evaluations. Note that the design matrix contains four
contrast variables that relate to one of the four pairwise compari-
sons. For instance, the second row of the matrix compares the
choice options i and k.
One feature of this model is that it is interval scaled with an
arbitrary origin. As a consequence, one of the four mean evalua-
tions can be set to 0, and one row of D can be omitted. Typically,
the last row of D is omitted from the model, and the last mean
evaluation (ls) is set to 0. This mean evaluation serves as a
reference choice option to which all other choice options are
compared. Another feature of the model is that it has no intercept.
Böckenholt (2001, 2004) provided a detailed description of this
model.
Level 2 specifications. In describing the Level 2 specifica-
tions of the proposed Thurstonian model, I begin with a very basic
model (Model 1) and then subsequently add additional explanatory
Level 2 effects (Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4). In the empirical
section of the article, I compare the fit of these models to inves-
tigate to what degree different Level 2 effects improve model fit.
Model 1: Level 2 specification with motivational conflict.
The basic Level 2 model incorporates only motivational conflict
and random person variation in motives. In this model, three
(achievement, affiliation, and power) of the four choice options
(achievement, affiliation, power, and other content) have a mean
evaluation effect . As mentioned previously, the fourth choice
option serves as the reference choice option to which the other
three choice options are compared (Böckenholt, 2001) and is set
to 0.
In the context of the Thurstonian model that I propose, the
three choice options with a mean evaluation effect  entail
achievement-related, affiliation-related, and power-related be-
havior, and the reference choice option entails other story
content. The  effects are fixed effects and represent the
average tendency to prefer the expression of the specific
motive-related behavior over the expression of all other choice
options. In addition to the mean evaluation effect , the model
includes the random effects v that capture the degree to which
the tendency of person s to show behavioral choices i, j, and k
instead of generating other story content differs from the aver-
age  effects. The v effects consequently model individual
differences as the tendency to which person s prefers a specific
motive-related behavior over expressing other story content.
The presence of the v effect transforms the model into a
mixed-effects model or an IRT model (De Boeck, 2008; De
Boeck et al., 2011; Doran, Bates, Bliese, & Dowling, 2007).

is
i vis.

js
j vjs.

ks
k vks.

ls 0.
(9)
The standard specification for mixed-effects models specifies
that each random effect vis is normally distributed with mean equal
to 0 and variance vi2 . The joint distribution of all random effects in
the model, vs 	 (v1s, . . . , v(I–1)s), is a multivariate normal
distribution with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix 
 (Böck-
enholt, 2001).
Model 2: Level 2 specification with picture effects. Model 2
extends Model 1 by also accounting for differences in mean
evaluations of the behavioral choice options between pictures
(Atkinson, 1958; Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2001; Schultheiss &
Pang, 2007; Tuerlinckx et al., 2002). The most common way of
modeling effects of variations across stimulus material like items
in IRT models (cf. De Boeck, 2008) is to model these variations as
fixed effects. In the context of the Thurstonian model, the standard
approach for modeling fixed-effect variations in the attractiveness
of choice options across pictures is to add picture and/or person
covariates xims (m 	 1, . . . M) to the mean evaluations is, js, and
ks. For the first mean evaluation is of each person, this leads to
the following equation.

is
im1M xims im vis. (10)
This approach can be used with pictures by designating one
picture the intercept picture and by then adding a picture-level
covariate for each of the remaining pictures (M 	 number of
pictures  1) for each mean evaluation. These picture covariates
are dummy variables coded 0 (person worked on the picture) and
1 (person did not work on the picture). The covariates determine to
what degree the mean evaluation in the other pictures differs from
the mean evaluation of the choice option in the intercept picture.
An alternative strategy is to exclude the mean evaluations i, j,
and k from the model and instead add picture covariates for all
pictures (M 	 number of pictures) such that the  effect for each
picture refers to the mean evaluation for the respective picture and
the Level 2 equations do not have an intercept. For the first utility
is of each person, this strategy results in the following specifica-
tion.

ism1M xims im vis (11)
A typical Level 2 model for a PSE with six pictures is provided
below. In this model specification, P1 to P6 are dummy variables
coded 1 when the pairwise comparison information is from the
picture and 0 when it is not.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
488 LANG

is P1si1 P2si2 P3si3 P4si4 P5si5 P6si6 vis.

js P1sj1 P2sj2 P3sj3 P4sj4 P5sj5 P6sj6 vjs.

ks P1sk1 P2sk2 P3sk3 P4sk4 P5sk5 P6sk6 vks.

ls 0. (12)
This approach for modeling picture effects is similar to the
psychometric approaches for the PSE described by Tuerlinckx et
al. (2002) in the sense that these approaches have also used fixed
effects to model differences between pictures. Picture effects can
alternatively also be modeled as random effects (cf. De Boeck,
2008) by retaining an average value for each comparison and
instead adding an additional random effect for the pictures (e.g.,
isc 	 i  vis  wic, where wic is the random picture effect for
picture c). Random picture effects allow for a more parsimonious
model with fewer degrees of freedom but would require the additional
assumptions that the pictures in PSE measures are systematically
sampled from a larger population of possible situations or pictures (De
Boeck, 2008). In practice, the substantive conclusions from both
approaches rarely differ (De Boeck, 2008). Throughout this article, I
model picture effects as fixed effects because this approach allows me
to more readily use the fixed-effect estimates from fitted models to
subsequently simulate data.
Model 3 and Model 4: Level 2 specifications with temporary
and sustained consummatory strength. In the description of
Model 1 and Model 2, I have drawn on literature on Thurstonian
models and on competition between motivational tendencies (e.g.,
Atkinson & Birch, 1970). In this subsection, I describe how the
Level 2 specification of the Thurstonian IRT model can be further
extended to also account for dynamic fluctuations in consumma-
tory strength.
I describe two models with two different operationalizations of
consummatory strength. Model 3 uses an operationalization of
consummatory strength that is conceptually similar to the one in
the dynamic apperception model of Tuerlinckx et al. (2002). For
the attractiveness of each choice option except the reference op-
tion, this model includes an additional fixed effect. This fixed
effect is a dichotomous dummy variable coded 1 when the story
written for the previous picture includes a response for the respec-
tive choice option and 0 when it does not. In Model 3, consum-
matory strength is consequently temporary and only lasts for one
picture after the original response. A typical Level 2 model for a
PSE with six pictures that includes temporary consummatory
strength effects (TCSi, TCSj, and TCSk) is provided below.

is P1si1 P2si2 P3si3 P4si4 P5si5 P6si6TCSisi7 vis.

js P1sj1 P2sj2 P3sj3 P4sj4 P5sj5 P6sj6TCSjsj7 vjs.

ks P1sk1 P2sk2 P3sk3 P4sk4 P5sk5 P6sk6TCSksk7 vks.

ls 0. (13)
The consummatory strength effects in the model alter the inter-
pretation of the picture-specific effects from the interpretation in
Model 2. The dummy variable is coded 0 when there is no
motive-related response in the previous picture and 1 when a
motive-related response is present. Accordingly, the picture-
specific effects in Model 3 indicate the motivational arousal of the
picture for the motive-related behavior of interest when there is no
motive-related response for the same choice option in the previous
picture.
In contrast to Model 3, consummatory strength effects in Model
4 last across the entire PSE session. Atkinson and Birch (1970, p.
97) and other researchers have not provided specific theoretical
ideas on how long consummatory strengths effects last. Model 4
consequently tests an alternative conceptualization of consumma-
tory strength.
The sustained consummatory strength effects (SCS) in Model 4
are operationalized by the number of previous pictures with a
motive-related response for the same motivational choice option
that occurred prior to the current picture (0	 no previous response
1 	 one previous responses, 2 	 two previous responses, . . .).
This conceptualization of longer lasting dynamic effects is derived
from dynamic IRT models used in other contexts (De Boeck et al.,
2011; Verguts & De Boeck, 2000; Verhelst & Glas, 1993). In the
model specification, the picture effects i2 to i6 refer to the mean
evaluation of the respective picture when no previous response for
choice option is has occurred in the PSE session.

is P1si1 P2si2 P3si3 P4si4 P5si5 P6si6 SCSisi7 vis.

js P1sj1 P2sj2 P3sj3 P4sj4 P5sj5 P6sj6 SCSjsj7 vjs.

ks P1sk1 P2sk2 P3sk3 P4sk4 P5sk5 P6sk6 SCSksk7 vks.

ls 0. (14)
The theoretical idea that underlies Model 4 is that the refractory
period in which the motives return to the level prior to the PSE
session is a process that takes a longer period of time and typically
occurs after the session is finished. Model 4 could potentially
provide an explanation for findings suggesting that the validity of
PSE scores tends to decline after more than eight pictures (Reit-
man & Schultheiss, 1958; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007).
Illustration of the Dynamic Effects in
Model 3 and Model 4
Dynamic effects as operationalized in the Verhelst and Glas
(1993) model, the dynamic apperception model of Tuerlinckx et al.
(2002), and the two dynamic models in this article (Model 3 and
Model 4) test the relationship between the occurrence of previous
responses to pictures and later responses. To illustrate how dy-
namic effects work, it is helpful to imagine a hypothetical scenario
in which a hypothetical group of persons exists that works on six
hypothetical pictures. Of interest is the response likelihood that the
model predicts for one of the three motives (e.g., power). The
persons have similar levels on all motives, and the six pictures
have identical motive arousal for persons without a previous
response (i.e., identical picture effects in the dynamic model). On
the first picture, the likelihood of a response is therefore identical
for all persons. The change in dynamic effects for these persons is
illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2A illustrates the change pattern for
two persons in Model 3 (dynamic effects lasting just one picture),
and Figure 2B provides a graph for the same two persons and one
additional person in Model 4 (long-lasting dynamic effects). Both
models predict decreases in the likelihood of a response following
a picture with a motive-related story for all persons. These changes
are independent of the content of the picture. Effects specific to the
content of the pictures and the coding process for these pictures are
captured in the picture effects, and dynamic effects test whether
the data contain a temporal sequence of responses such that earlier
responses are associated with a lower likelihood of subsequent
responses. This conceptualization resembles dynamics of action
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effects as described by Atkinson and Birch (compare Figure 2B
with Figures 1.4b and 1.4c in Atkinson & Birch, 1970; also see
their Figures 1.3 and 4.5).
Summary and Examples
Dynamic system theories of motivation explain the internal
consistency reliability paradox with the idea that behavioral ten-
dencies to express motives compete in a system and that acting out
a motive reduces the tendency to express the motive in subsequent
behavior (consummatory strength). I have described a dynamic
and Thurstonian IRT modeling approach allowing researchers to
model these processes in PSE measures.
I have started by describing two basic versions of the model
(Model 1 and Model 2) that are only Thurstonian but not dynamic
and that conceptualize the probability that a motive-related behav-
ior indicative of a specific motive (e.g., achievement) is chosen
over other behavioral responses (affiliation, power, and other con-
tent) as a function of the latent motive of interest (i.e., achieve-
ment) and the strength of the other response tendencies. These
models contrast with previously used psychometric models for the
PSE like the Rasch model or classic test theory approaches that
only focus on one motive and do not consider data for other
motives. In classic (raw) PSE scores, two people who write down
two achievement-related thoughts would both have a raw achieve-
ment score of 2. However, in reality, one of the two persons may
be more achievement motivated but also high on another motive
(e.g., power). As a result, the power motive surfaces and does not
allow the person to also show his or her achievement motive. In the
Thurstonian framework, the IRT model would correct for the fact
that the person is high on power motivation such that some
achievement-related responses likely did not surface because
power-related content dominated.
In addition to the basic Thurstonian models, I have also de-
scribed two more elaborate models that are not only Thurstonian
but also dynamic (Model 3 and Model 4). Model 3 and Model 4
use two different conceptualizations of consummatory strength. In
Model 3, consummatory strength is temporary and only lasts for
one picture after the original response (cf. Tuerlinckx et al., 2002).
For instance, an achievement response to the third picture reduces
the likelihood of another achievement response in the fourth pic-
ture. When the person does not write an achievement-related story
in the fourth picture, the interaction variable jumps back to the
normal value at the fifth picture. Model 4 assumes that effects of
consummatory strength do not quickly disappear as in Model 3 and
are instead sustained for the entire PSE session. In Model 4, an
achievement response to the third picture reduces the likelihood of
another achievement response in the fourth picture. However,
when the person does not write an achievement-related story in the
fourth picture, the consummatory strength variable in Model 4
does not jump back to the normal value at the fifth picture as it
would in Model 3. Instead, the likelihood of an achievement
response is also reduced in the fifth picture. Another achievement
response in the fifth picture would reduce the relative likelihood of
an achievement response further for the sixth picture.
Empirical Study: Reanalysis of Gurin, Veroff, and
Feld (1957)
To evaluate the described theoretical ideas using real PSE data,
I reanalyzed a classic data set on the PSE (Gurin et al., 1957,
1960). These data have previously been used to study the psycho-
metric properties of the PSE (Tuerlinckx et al., 2002; Veroff, Feld,
& Crockett, 1966) and are unique because of their size and the fact
that the data were systematically sampled from the American
population.
The empirical study had three specific goals. First, I sought to
investigate whether the model fitted the data and to what the
degree the fit of the different model specifications (Model 1,
Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4) altered model fit. Second, I was
interested in the degree to which latent motive estimates from the
proposed Thurstonian model correlated with each other and with
raw motive scores. Brown and Maydeu-Olivares (2011) suggested
that (uncorrected) raw scores from forced-choice data typically
show reduced intercorrelations because of scale restrictions that
change when Thurstonian IRT models are applied. Third, I sought
to derive estimates of the parameters in the proposed Thurstonian
model in order to subsequently simulate data with similar proper-
ties in the simulation study (see next section).
Figure 2. Dynamic changes in the mean evaluation () of a motive-
related behavior across pictures as a function of previous motive-related
responses in Model 3 (Panel A) and Model 4 (Panel B). For illustrative
purposes, picture effects are assumed to be equal for all pictures, and the
persons have identical latent motives.
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Method
The data that I analyzed were systematically sampled from
the population and came from a study that was conducted by
Gurin et al. (1957, 1960). In the Gurin et al. study, men and
women both wrote stories in response to six PSE pictures. The
pictures were presented in a fixed order. Five of the six pictures
differed for men and women. A total of nine raters coded the
stories for motive content. Each rater coded stories from two
pictures for one motive across the entire data set, and the
quality of the rating process was ensured using regular quality
checks. Veroff et al. (1960) provided a detailed description of
the rating process.
Because men and women worked on largely different pic-
tures, I analyzed the data for men (Sample 1) and women
(Sample 2) separately. The raw data file included responses for
a total of 715 men and 905 women. A small proportion of these
participants had considerable amounts of missing data in the
PSE. I decided to exclude all participants who failed to provide
any type of response (no matter whether motive-related or not)
to more than two of the six PSE pictures because cases with
considerable nonresponse may bias estimates upward or down-
ward. This strategy reduced the sample sizes to a total of 695
men and 887 women.
I fitted Thurstonian models using the glmer function from the
lme4 1.0 –5 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2013;
De Boeck et al., 2011; Doran et al., 2007) in the R environment
(R Development Core Team, 2013). The glmer function com-
monly uses the Laplace approximation (Bates, 2010; Bates et
al., 2013; Böckenholt, 2001; Bolker et al., 2009; Doran et al.,
2007) and estimates random effect scores using the maximum a
posteriori method (De Boeck et al., 2011). I used the bobyqa
optimizer in glmer and a tolerance level of 0.00001 for the
penalized, weighted, residual sum-of-squares step of the esti-
mation procedure (Bates, 2010; Bates et al., 2013; Doran et al.,
2007) because the bobyqa optimizer is the most robust opti-
mizer in Version 1.0 –5 of lme4. I checked the model estimates
by refitting the models with other optimization settings in glmer
and by fitting the models using the Markov chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) estimation procedure (Bolker et al., 2009; Hadfield,
2010) in the MCMCglmm package in R (Hadfield, 2010). When
models converged in glmer, the substantive conclusions were
the same. The MCMC estimates also led to similar substantive
conclusions.
To evaluate the role of picture effects and consummatory
strength, I contrasted the previously described four versions of the
Thurstonian model: the basic model without picture effects (Model
1), the model with picture effects (Model 2), the model with
picture effects and temporary consummatory strength that lasts for
only one picture (Model 3), and the model with picture effects and
sustained consummatory strength that accumulate during the PSE
session (Model 4). To compare the fit of the four models, I used
likelihood ratio tests, the Akaike information criterion (AIC), and
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). AIC and BIC seek to
make a tradeoff between model complexity and model fit. Models
with a smaller value of AIC and/or BIC are generally considered
to have a better fit.
Results
Table 2 provides descriptive information and conventional
estimates of reliability for the Gurin et al. (1957) data. As
indicated by Table 2, pictures differed in their potential to
arouse particular motives. Cronbach’s alpha values were within
the typical and expected range of .10 to .40 (e.g., Entwisle,
1972) regardless of whether Cronbach’s alpha values were
estimated using dichotomous picture scores (motive content
present: yes 	 1, no 	 0) or the number of motive-related
responses. The low values for Cronbach’s alpha were not a
result of known limitations of Cronbach’s alpha as a measure of
internal consistency reliability (e.g., Bentler, 2009; Revelle &
Zinbarg, 2009; Sijtsma, 2009) because a frequently recom-
mended alternative measure (Bentler, 2009; Sijtsma, 2009)—
the greatest lower bound (e.g., Woodhouse & Jackson, 1977)—
also did not yield estimates that were close to commonly
desired levels of reliability (see Table 2).
I began the Thurstonian IRT analyses by fitting the four differ-
ent versions of the model to the data. As shown in Table 3, the
comparison between the basic model (Model 1) and the model that
additionally includes picture effects (Model 2) suggested that
accounting for picture effects improved the model fit, which is in
line with the observation that pictures differed in their potential to
arouse specific motives. Table 3 also indicates that extending
Model 2 by adding effects for consummatory strength (Model 3
and Model 4) further improved model fit. Although Model 3 and
Model 4 both increased model fit, there was a marked difference
in the amount of improvement. Model 4 led to a much more
pronounced increase in model fit. The two models—Model 3 and
Model 4—are not nested such that a direct (likelihood ratio) test of
the difference in fit is not possible. However, information indices
also uniformly favored Model 4. I therefore selected Model 4 for
further analyses.
Tables 4 and 5 provide model coefficients and additional detail
on Model 4. The mean evaluations of the achievement, affiliation,
and power choice options in the model indicate relative differences
to the response option for other story content. Positive coefficients
indicate that a response for these options was more likely than the
choice of the other option, and negative coefficients indicate that
it was less likely. The fixed effects for consummatory strength
were in the predicted direction such that the occurrence of a
motive-related response in the previous picture reduced the like-
lihood of another motive-related response in subsequent pictures.
In interpreting the picture effects, it is important to be aware that
the effects in Tables 4 and 5 refer to the strength of an effect in a
person without any previous response in the session. For instance,
the average effect for observing an affiliation-related response in
Picture 4 (men with drafting board) in the male sample is 1.33
relative to the choice option for other story content when no
previous affiliation-related response has occurred. Each affiliation
response that occurs in a picture prior to Picture 4 (i.e., in Pictures
1–3) reduces the average affiliation versus other effect for Picture
4 by 1.80.
Tables 4 and 5 also show that the random effects for persons and
fixed effects for pictures had substantial variability, indicating that
the way persons responded to pictures substantially differed across
persons and that pictures differed in the degree to which they
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491ITEM RESPONSE THEORY OF THE PICTURE STORY EXERCISE
aroused specific motivational response choices. Variability in re-
sponses across persons and pictures is generally desirable because
psychometric instruments need this variability to effectively allo-
cate persons on a latent continuum.
Table 6 provides details on the latent motive scores for each of
the motives from the dynamic Thurstonian IRT model. The latent
motive scores showed high correlations with the raw (traditional)
scores. Table 6 also shows that the correlations between the latent
Table 2
Descriptive Information for the Gurin, Veroff, and Feld (1957) Data
Picture
Achievement Affiliation Power
% M (SD) % M (SD) % M (SD)
Sample 1 (male)
1. Machine shop 0.29 0.98 (1.65) 0.02 0.02 (0.18) 0.11 0.19 (0.55)
2. Table group 0.21 0.78 (1.55) 0.15 0.34 (0.92) 0.13 0.30 (0.80)
3. Man with two kids 0.02 0.04 (0.29) 0.16 0.43 (1.11) 0.38 1.00 (1.40)
4. Man with drafting board 0.11 0.35 (1.04) 0.50 1.80 (2.01) 0.01 0.02 (0.21)
5. Conference 0.11 0.41 (1.17) 0.32 0.94 (1.52) 0.29 0.60 (1.01)
6. Couple 0.02 0.06 (0.47) 0.31 1.02 (1.62) 0.20 0.60 (1.31)
Total scale 0.76 2.62 (3.20) 1.47 4.53 (3.59) 1.12 2.70 (2.69)
Cronbach’s  0.23 0.27 0.13 0.16 0.23 0.26
glb 0.32 0.37 0.21 0.25 0.30 0.33
Sample 1 (female)
1. Laboratory 0.42 1.44 (1.84) 0.01 0.07 (0.71) 0.10 0.20 (0.82)
2. Women with girl 0.03 0.87 (0.63) 0.53 1.54 (1.64) 0.26 0.66 (1.22)
3. Group 0.03 0.23 (1.18) 0.42 1.38 (1.90) 0.06 0.26 (1.18)
4. Chair cover 0.30 0.95 (1.50) 0.06 0.11 (0.56) 0.01 0.03 (0.37)
5. Food preparation 0.29 1.13 (1.83) 0.37 0.95 (1.37) 0.06 0.11 (0.52)
6. Couple 0.01 0.71 (0.69) 0.33 1.18 (1.82) 0.23 0.74 (1.51)
Total scale 1.07 3.64 (3.28) 1.73 4.99 (3.56) 0.71 1.74 (2.12)
Cronbach’s  0.17 0.17 0.23 0.20 0.13 0.13
glb 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.17 0.17
Note. n 	 695 for male sample, and n 	 887 for female sample. For each motive, the values in the first column
(labeled %) refer to dichotomous picture scores (motive content present: yes 	 1, no 	 0), and the second
column refers to the number of motive-related responses. The pictures and sources of the pictures are available
in the codebook provided with the Gurin, Veroff, and Feld (1957) data. glb 	 greatest lower bound estimate of
reliability (e.g., Woodhouse & Jackson, 1977), estimated using the glb.algebraic function in the psych package
(Revelle, 2012) in the R environment (R Core Team, 2013).
Table 3
Model Comparisons
Model df logLik Deviance AIC BIC df 2
Sample 1 (male)
Model 1 9 14,009 28,019 28,037 28,104
Model 2: Picture effects 24 10,321 20,642 20,690 20,869
Model 1 vs. Model 2 15 7,376
Model 3: Picture effects and temporary CS 27 10,071 20,141 20,195 20,397
Model 2 vs. Model 3 3 501
Model 4: Picture effects and sustained CS 27 8,492 16,985 17,039 17,240
Model 2 vs. Model 4 3 3,657
Sample 2 (female)
Model 1 9 18,417 36,835 36,853 36,922
Model 2: Picture effects 24 12,129 24,258 24,306 24,491
Model 1 vs. Model 2 15 12,577
Model 3: Picture effects and temporary CS 27 11,864 23,729 23,783 23,991
Model 2 vs. Model 3 3 529
Model 4: Picture effects and sustained CS 27 10,085 20,169 20,223 20,432
Model 2 vs. Model 4 3 4,088
Note. For the male sample, k 	 12,921 pairwise comparisons nested in n 	 695 persons and six items. For the
female sample, k 	 16,632 pairwise comparisons nested in n 	 887 persons and six items. logLik 	
log-likelihood; AIC 	 Akaike information criterion; BIC 	 Bayesian information criterion; CS 	 consumma-
tory strength.
 p  .001.
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motive estimates were generally positive, whereas the correlations
between the raw scores were closer to 0. These findings are in line
with the idea that forced-choice processes reduce the correlation
between latent variables when raw scores are used (Brown &
Maydeu-Olivares, 2011).
Simulation Study: Estimating the Squared
Correlation Reliability
In my empirical examination of the Gurin et al. (1957) data, I
found that the Thurstonian model with sustained consummatory
strength effects (Model 4) provided the best fit to the data among
the variants of the Thurstonian model that I tested. This model
contrasts choices for achievement, affiliation, and power behaviors
and choices for other story content and incorporates sustained
consummatory strength effects that persist for a PSE session and
accumulate across pictures. I also found that this model yielded a
plausible pattern of intercorrelations between latent motive esti-
mates and raw scores.
The purpose of the simulation study was to conduct a critical
test of the idea that the dynamic Thurstonian model with sustained
consummatory strength effects (Model 4) is capable of providing
a psychometric explanation for the internal consistency paradox. A
viable explanation for the internal consistency paradox would be
simulated data in which Model 4 estimates the true underlying
latent motives but reliability as measured by traditional internal
consistency indices like Cronbach’s alpha is nevertheless low.2
The simulation study accordingly investigated whether simulating
data on the basis of Model 4 would yield data from which the true
motives could be recovered using the model and low Cronbach’s
alpha values. I also examined the degree to which simulated data
on the basis of Model 4 could show two other typical character-
istics of PSE data: high test–retest correlations and moderate
within-person profile correlations across test and retest (Busch &
Hofer, 2012; Schultheiss et al., 2008; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007).
Method
I adopted a simulation research design that researchers have
used in extant psychometric research for studying questions on
reliability (Brown & Maydeu-Olivares, 2011; Reise & Yu, 1990;
Weiss, 1982). In this research design, data sets on the basis of
psychometric (IRT) mechanism are generated, and an IRT model
that captures the hypothesized underlying mechanism is then fitted
to these simulated data sets. Finally, the correlation between the
2 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this type of analysis.
Table 4
Parameter Estimates for Model 4 in Sample 1 (Male) and in Simulated Data
Estimate Model 4
Average across 100
simulated data sets
based on Model 4
Average across 100
simulated data sets
based on Model 4
and bias-corrected
Fixed effects
nAch: Picture 1 (machine shop) 1.34 2.46 0.85
nAch: Picture 2 (table group) 0.50 1.27 0.10
nAch: Picture 3 (man with two kids) 2.15 2.47 1.58
nAch: Picture 4 (man with drafting board) 0.03 0.40 0.63
nAch: Picture 5 (conference) 0.83 0.67 1.50
nAch: Picture 6 (couple) 0.32 0.23 0.30
nAff: Picture 1 (machine shop) 3.53 4.03 3.64
nAff: Picture 2 (table group) 1.47 1.84 1.50
nAff: Picture 3 (man with two kids) 0.74 0.90 0.75
nAff: Picture 4 (man with drafting board) 1.33 1.14 1.36
nAff: Picture 5 (conference) 1.80 2.05 1.94
nAff: Picture 6 (couple) 2.29 2.76 2.50
nPow: Picture 1 (machine shop) 2.11 2.64 2.23
nPow: Picture 2 (table group) 1.46 1.79 1.53
nPow: Picture 3 (man with two kids) 0.35 0.15 0.31
nPow: Picture 4 (man with drafting board) 1.45 1.14 1.41
nPow: Picture 5 (conference) 1.05 1.22 1.10
nPow: Picture 6 (couple) 1.35 1.81 1.46
nAch: CSnAch 2.65 3.40 2.74
nAff: CSnAFF 1.80 2.27 1.93
nPow: CSnPow 1.88 2.43 2.01
Random effects
SDnAch 3.49 4.69 3.11
SDnAff 2.21 2.71 2.28
SDnPow 2.49 3.10 2.59
rnAchnAff 0.32 0.40 0.28
rnAchnPow 0.28 0.31 0.26
rnAffnPow 0.21 0.24 0.22
Note. k 	 12,921 pairwise comparisons nested in n 	 695 persons and six items. nAch 	 achievement vs.
other; nAff 	 affiliation vs. other; nPow 	 power vs. other; CS 	 consummatory strength operationalized as
the number of previous motive-related responses.
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493ITEM RESPONSE THEORY OF THE PICTURE STORY EXERCISE
estimates of the latent variables from the IRT model in the simu-
lated data sets and the (true) latent variables underlying the sim-
ulated data sets are estimated. This correlation is also frequently
labeled the fidelity coefficient (Weiss, 1982). An important char-
acteristic of fidelity coefficients is that the squared fidelity coef-
ficient is equivalent to the squared correlation reliability. The
squared correlation reliability is a common theoretical definition of
reliability (see Lord & Novick, 1968, p. 61).
The study included a total of 400 simulated data sets in four
different simulation sequences. The first and the second simulation
sequences contained 100 data sets that were generated on the basis
of the IRT estimates in the male Gurin et al. (1957) data and 100
data sets based on the female Gurin et al. data, respectively. The
third and fourth simulation sequences each included 100 data sets
that were generated using the IRT estimates from the male and the
female Gurin et al. data after the original estimates were corrected
for bias on the basis of the first and second simulation sequences.
Bias in generalized linear mixed-effects models (GLMMs) is not
uncommon because GLMMs are generally difficult to fit (Böck-
enholt, 2001; Bolker et al., 2009; Kuk, 1995; Ng, Carpenter,
Goldstein, & Rabash, 2006). The Laplace method in glmer that I
used commonly shows smaller bias than the frequently used pe-
nalized quasi-likelihood method (Böckenholt, 2001; Bolker et al.,
2009).
In line with the idea behind the adopted research design (Brown
& Maydeu-Olivares, 2011; Reise & Yu, 1990; Weiss, 1982), the
simulation program first sampled true latent variables from a
population in which the standard deviations and correlations of the
latent variables were equal to the IRT latent variable estimates (the
person random effects in glmer) in each simulation run. In the next
step, the program generated simulated data by first estimating the
response probability for each of the four response possibilities
(achievement, affiliation, power, and other content) for each per-
son and for each picture on the basis of the IRT estimates. To get
a realistic number of responses, I randomly sampled the overall
number of motive-related responses for each picture from the
distribution of responses in the Gurin et al. (1957) data. I ac-
counted for the fact that the response information for the other-
content choice option did not contain information on the number of
responses (only a single other response was possible) by correcting
the response probabilities accordingly such that the likelihood of
an other-content response relative to the motive responses was as
likely as the estimated probabilities. After the data were generated,
I fitted the Thurstonian IRT model with sustained consummatory
strength effects to each of the simulated data sets using the glmer
function and the same estimation settings as in the empirical study.
I then estimated the squared correlation reliability (the correlation
between the underlying true latent motives, , and the estimated
Table 5
Parameter Estimates for Model 4 in Sample 2 (Female) and in Simulated Data
Estimate Model 4
Average across 100
simulated data sets
based on Model 4
Average across 100
simulated data sets
based on Model 4
and bias-corrected
Fixed effects
nAch: Picture 1 (laboratory) 0.04 0.53 0.08
nAch: Picture 2 (women with girl) 1.57 1.69 1.42
nAch: Picture 3 (group) 1.60 1.54 1.45
nAch: Picture 4 (chair cover) 0.77 0.80 0.95
nAch: Picture 5 (food preparation) 2.30 2.69 2.58
nAch: Picture 6 (couple) 0.36 1.26 0.78
nAff: Picture 1 (laboratory) 3.20 3.70 3.08
nAff: Picture 2 (women with girl) 1.10 0.84 1.16
nAff: Picture 3 (group) 1.14 1.20 1.23
nAff: Picture 4 (chair cover) 0.35 0.28 0.14
nAff: Picture 5 (food preparation) 1.78 2.23 1.93
nAff: Picture 6 (couple) 2.29 3.01 2.50
nPow: Picture 1 (laboratory) 2.81 3.51 2.51
nPow: Picture 2 (women with girl) 0.42 0.86 0.13
nPow: Picture 3 (group) 1.27 1.29 0.94
nPow: Picture 4 (chair cover) 2.29 2.07 1.92
nPow: Picture 5 (food preparation) 0.81 0.74 0.52
nPow: Picture 6 (couple) 0.75 0.83 1.03
nAch: CSnAch 2.78 3.56 2.97
nAff: CSnAff 1.41 2.00 1.50
nPow: CSnPow 2.69 3.32 2.76
Random effects
SDnAch 2.97 3.73 3.07
SDnAff 1.90 2.47 1.93
SDnPow 2.90 3.58 2.86
rnAchnAff 0.38 0.41 0.38
rnAchnPow 0.22 0.24 0.22
rnAffnPow 0.21 0.26 0.22
Note. k 	 16,632 pairwise comparisons nested in n 	 887 persons and six items. nAch 	 achievement vs.
other; nAff 	 affiliation vs. other; nPow 	 power vs. other; CS 	 consummatory strength operationalized as
the number of previous motive-related responses.
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latent motive scores from the model, ˆ), Cronbach’s alpha in the
simulated data, and the greatest lower bound in the simulated data
for each motive. I also examined the possible test–retest reliability
for each raw motive score and the possible average within-person
profile correlation. I therefore generated a parallel data set based
on the same underlying true latent motives  for each simulation
run. These parallel data sets capture the (hypothetical) scenario of
a perfect retest (i.e., a retest in which the underlying true latent
motives are exactly like in the initial test).
Results
Average model estimates across the simulation runs are pro-
vided in Tables 4 and 5. The picture estimates in the initial
noncorrected simulation runs were close to the original values, and
the precision of the estimates was generally similar to simulation
studies with similar models reported in the literature (Böckenholt,
2001, p. 59). However, the models showed some tendency to
overestimate the variability in the random effects and the size of
the consummatory strength effects. When I corrected for bias in
the bias-corrected simulation sequences, the average model esti-
mates became more similar to the model estimates from the
original empirical data. I consequently proceeded by examining
the reliability of the PSE in the bias-corrected simulated data.
Table 6 provides average intercorrelations between the raw
scores and the latent motive scores in these simulated data sets. As
indicated by Table 6, the pattern of intercorrelations in the simu-
lated data was similar to the pattern of intercorrelations in the
original data. The average squared correlation reliability—the cor-
relation between the latent motive estimates ( ˆ) from the IRT
model and the true underlying latent motives ()—for each of the
motives is provided in Table 7. Five of the six squared correlation
reliability coefficients in Table 7 exceed the commonly desired
level of reliability of .70 (Smith et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the
traditional estimates of internal consistency reliability in the sim-
ulated data were very similar to the estimates in the original
empirical data (see Table 7). I also found that the possible test–
retest correlations for raw scores were high and that the possible
within-person correlations (profile correlations) were also moder-
ate to high (see Table 7). In summary, the findings suggest that the
Thurstonian IRT model with sustained consummatory strength
(Model 4) is capable of explaining the internal consistency para-
dox and that simulated data from the model also show other typical
characteristics of actual PSE data (cf. Schultheiss et al., 2008;
Schultheiss & Pang, 2007).
Discussion
Psychometricians have long sought to model the response pro-
cess in the PSE using psychometric methods to better understand
what is happening in the PSE and to solve the apparent paradox of
low internal consistency reliability on indices like Cronbach’s
alpha but considerable predictive power for behavioral outcomes
that is a specific characteristic of PSE motive measures. In this
article, I built on earlier research and described a dynamic and
Thurstonian IRT model of the PSE response process. This psy-
chometric model is a psychometric representation of two core
theoretical principles in dynamic system theories of motivation
Table 6
Intercorrelations Between Raw Motive Scores (Sum of Pictures
With Motive-Related Content) and Estimated Latent Motive
Scores ˆ From Model 4 in the Real Data and in the
Bias-Corrected Simulated Data
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6
Sample 1 (male, below the diagonal) and Sample 2 (female, above the
diagonal)
1. Achievement: Raw score — .18 .09 .95 .26 .16
2. Affiliation: Raw score .06 — .03 .27 .95 .10
3. Power: Raw score .08 .01 — .13 .10 .94
4. Achievement: ˆ .96 .21 .16 — .37 .21
5. Affiliation: ˆ .13 .94 .06 .28 — .19
6. Power: ˆ .15 .09 .94 .25 .16 —
Average across 100 simulated data sets for Sample 1 (male, below the
diagonal) and Sample 2 (female, above the diagonal)
1. Achievement: Raw score — .28 .11 .95 .32 .17
2. Affiliation: Raw score .16 — .15 .31 .96 .18
3. Power: Raw score .15 .18 — .09 .13 .95
4. Achievement: ˆ .96 .23 .21 — .36 .20
5. Affiliation: ˆ .19 .95 .16 .26 — .19
6. Power: ˆ .18 .18 .96 .25 .19 —
Note. n 	 695 for Sample 1 (male), and n 	 887 for Sample 2 (female).
For Sample 1, correlations of r  |.08| are significant at p  .05. For
Sample 2, correlations of r  |.07| are significant at p  .05.
Table 7
Squared Correlation Reliability (r
ˆ
2 ) for Model 4 and
Traditional Measures of Reliability in Bias-Corrected
Simulated Data
Motive r
ˆ
2 Cronbach’s  glb
Perfect retest
rtt Profile r
Average across 100 simulated data sets for Sample 1 (male)
Achievement .77 .19 (.27) .35 (.40) .78 (.73) .55
Affiliation .75 .18 (.21) .28 (.29) .71 (.61) .39
Power .74 .28 (.32) .37 (.40) .74 (.69) .50
Average across 100 simulated data sets for Sample 2 (female)
Achievement .78 .17 (.18) .33 (.35) .75 (.68) .57
Affiliation .67 .25 (.29) .32 (.36) .64 (.58) .41
Power .72 .16 (.22) .26 (.31) .73 (.66) .65
Note. n 	 695 in each simulated data set for Sample 1 (male), and n 	
887 in each simulated data set for Sample 2 (female). Cronbach’s , glb,
and rtt are based on scales that were scored 1 for motive content and 0 for
no motive content. The values in parentheses were estimated using the
number of responses in each picture. Retest values with perfect stability
were estimated by simulating an additional simulated data set with the
same underlying true latent motives  for each simulation run. r
ˆ
2
	
squared correlation reliability estimated by squaring the correlation be-
tween the true underlying latent motives  and the estimated maximum a
posteriori estimates of the latent motives ˆ from Model 4; glb 	 greatest
lower bound estimate of reliability (e.g., Woodhouse & Jackson, 1977),
estimated using the glb.algebraic function in the psych package (Revelle,
2012) in the R environment (R Core Team, 2013); rtt 	 correlation
between raw sum scores from two simulation runs with the same under-
lying latent motive values ; profile r 	 average within-person correlation
(k 	 6 pictures) between picture motive content (0 vs. 1) in two simulation
runs with the same underlying latent motive values .
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(e.g., Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Revelle,
1986). The first principle is the idea that motivational tendencies to
express motives and other behavior compete and that only the
strongest tendency leads to actual behavior. The second principle
is the notion that acting out a motive temporarily reduces people’s
subsequent tendency to act out the motive.
In empirical analyses of an archival data set (Gurin et al., 1957),
I found that the dynamic Thurstonian IRT model could be fitted to
real PSE data. I also found that incorporating consummatory
strength effects generally improved the model fit and that a version
of the model in which consummatory strength effects lasted for
more than a single picture after the initial display of motive-related
behavior provided the relatively best fit to the data. The findings of
the reported empirical study are the first psychometric evidence for
the existence of consummatory strength effects in real PSE data of
which I am aware.
I also conducted a simulation study in which I simulated data on
the basis of the model estimates from the empirical study. This
study revealed that the squared correlation reliability (the squared
correlation between the underlying true motives and the motive
estimates from the model) was .74 on average. Nevertheless,
Cronbach’s alpha values were similar to real PSE data (.35), and
also, other features of the simulated data were in line with typical
findings in real PSE data (Schultheiss et al., 2008; Schultheiss &
Pang, 2007). The findings consequently suggest that the proposed
dynamic Thurstonian IRT model can explain the internal consis-
tency paradox.
Implications for Motivational Research
This research advances the motivational literature in several
ways. One important contribution to motivational research is that
this study shows that the PSE is a reliable measurement instrument
when six pictures are carefully selected and coding is done with
care (two features I assume were the case in the archival data I
examined). These findings provide an important new perspective
on the old debate on the reliability of the three major motives
(power, affiliation, and achievement) in the classic PSE. Decades
ago, several researchers argued that the PSE is not and cannot be
a reliable measurement instrument. My simulation findings on the
squared correlation reliability of the PSE based on the archival
Gurin et al. (1957) data suggest that these notions now need to be
revised because modern psychometric methods can model the
response process in the PSE and yield reliable scores on the basis
of data from a typical PSE session with six pictures.
This article also advances the motivational literature by provid-
ing a better understanding of the PSE response process. Psycho-
metricians consider a psychometric theory that exactly specifies
how behavioral responses in a psychological measurement instru-
ment relate to a latent construct to be a major source of validity
evidence for psychological constructs. In recent years, there has
been a trend in validity theory to focus on this aspect of validity
evidence (Borsboom, 2006; Borsboom, Mellenberg, & van
Heerden, 2004). From the perspective of psychometric validity
theory, previous psychometric studies have provided important
insights into the response processes in PSE motive measures.
However, previous psychometric studies have not resulted in psy-
chometric models yielding internal consistency or latent-variable
reliability estimates in the range commonly observed for other
measurement approaches in psychology and a profound under-
standing of the PSE response process. The psychometric evidence
described in this article revises earlier notions that the PSE re-
sponse process is erratic and provides psychometric validity evi-
dence by presenting a comprehensive psychometric model of the
response process. The response process in the described psycho-
metric model is different from earlier psychometric models in that
it does not focus on modeling the latent motive variance in one
specific motive but rather incorporates the activational dynamics
between picture content, several motives, and persons in a multi-
variate choice process. Modeling this response process leads to
latent-variable reliability estimates on the basis of a PSE admin-
istration that are in the range of typically desired levels of reli-
ability (Smith et al., 2000). A core finding of this article is
consequently that a PSE with six pictures provides meaningful
measures of three separate constructs in a response pattern that can
be predicted using a dynamic Thurstonian IRT model.
This article also contributes to motivational research by render-
ing earlier findings using PSE measures to be more credible than
previously thought. Psychologists and organizational researchers
have assembled a considerable empirical literature showing that
PSE measures predict behavior (see McClelland et al., 1989;
Spangler, 1992; Winter et al., 1998). The evidence I presented in
this article suggests that these findings are not surprising because
researchers likely assembled the empirical literature on the PSE
largely using a psychometrically valid and reliable measurement
instrument.
Finally, this research contributes to the motivation literature
more broadly by showing that core principles of dynamic system
theories can explain actual behavioral patterns and can be studied
using psychometric methods. Dynamic system theories of motiva-
tion are a class of theories that can be broadly applied in many
different situations (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Carver & Scheier,
1998; Revelle, 1986). I accordingly believe that the described
analytical framework will be helpful in modeling and understand-
ing behavior in future motivational research.
Limitations
One limitation of this research is the fact that the empirical data
I used may have been assembled under near ideal conditions. The
coders who conducted the coding were well trained, the sample
size was large, the sample was systematically sampled from the
population, and six PSE pictures were presented to participants. In
the more common convenience samples with sample sizes between
100 and 200 participants that psychological researchers frequently
use, reliability may be lower, and it may be more difficult to derive
stable estimates for picture effects and latent motives. Further-
more, researchers have sometimes used only four PSE pictures (cf.
Entwisle, 1972), and four PSE pictures may frequently not be
sufficient for getting appropriate levels of measurement precision
(also see Schultheiss & Pang, 2007).
A second limitation pertains to the dynamic Thurstonian IRT
model that I described. This model does not account for individual
differences in the strength of consummatory effects. However,
theoretical work suggests that individual differences in consum-
matory strength may be important (Revelle, 1986, 2012). I there-
fore checked whether it is possible to extend the model by incor-
porating differences in consummatory strength between persons. I
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modified Model 4 by adding a random effect d for each consum-
matory strength effect. In the model specification, the random
effect dis indicates to what degree the consummatory strength
effect for behavioral choice option i for person s differs from the
average consummatory strength effect i7. The resulting Level 2
specification for is is is 	 P1si1  P2si2  P3si3  P4si4 
P5si5  P6si6  SCSisi7  vis  dis. This extension of the
model is analogous to extensions of the dynamic Rasch model by
a random component to account for individual differences in
change (De Boeck et al., 2011; Verguts & De Boeck, 2000). I
specified that the random effects dis, djs, and dks would be corre-
lated with each other but not with the other random effects (vis, vjs,
and vks). When I fitted this model to the Gurin et al. (1957) data,
it converged in both samples after I increased the number of
iterations in glmer. The model also showed improved model fit,
and the analyses consequently suggest that consummatory strength
varies between persons. However, the estimated latent motive
scores ( ˆ) for the implicit motives (vis, vjs, and vks) in the model
were highly correlated with the corresponding estimates from the
model without person variability in consummatory strength (r 	
.90–.96). I accordingly believe that this more complex model
provides a basis for future research on individual differences in
consummatory strength but may not necessarily be needed when
researchers are primarily interested in estimating latent scores for
implicit motives.
A third limitation of this research is that I did not explore
theoretical models of the PSE response process beyond dynamic
system theories. In particular, Schultheiss et al. (2008; Schultheiss
& Schultheiss, 2014) have developed a theory of the PSE response
process—the if–then approach—that is distinct from dynamic sys-
tem theories and that builds on early work by Atkinson (1958). The
if–then approach suggests that a theoretical explanation for typical
findings on internal consistency reliability, ipsative stability, and
test–retest reliability in PSE research could be that a given motive
is typically shown in behavior in a person-specific manner that is
shaped by person-specific social learning experiences. These
person-specific learning experiences allow for systematic within-
person stability over time but do not necessarily lead to systematic
between-person variability that is uniform across items. The psy-
chometric models that I have tested in this article do not test the
if–then approach or theoretical ideas that are similar to the if–then
approach, and it is therefore up to future research to explore the
psychometric implications of this theoretical approach.
A fourth limitation of this study is its generalizability beyond
the three motives (achievement, affiliation, and power) and the
PSE. I believe that this research provides no basis for generalizing
the findings beyond this particular situation of PSE scoring or to
measures like the Rorschach and the debate regarding the Ror-
schach (cf. Lilienfeld et al., 2000). Nevertheless, the theoretical
and psychometric principles that I have discussed may be useful in
the development of psychometric approaches for other projective
procedures.
Future Directions
The psychometric models that I have presented in this article
provide a basis for advancing the measurement of motives and
other projective constructs in future research. In particular, I en-
courage researchers to use the proposed dynamic Thurstonian IRT
model to estimate latent motive scores for achievement, affiliation,
and power from PSE measures in future studies and in reanalyses
of existing data. In the reported empirical analyses, I found that
latent motive scores from the dynamic Thurstonian IRT model and
raw motive scores estimated using the traditional approach were
frequently highly correlated. Nevertheless, I believe using the
latent motive scores from the dynamic Thurstonian IRT model
may be a better approach because latent motive scores provide
more precise estimates of the latent motives behind the response
patterns and more effectively isolate latent motives from each
other. Latent motive scores may also be useful for linking data sets
that share some but not all pictures using IRT equating approaches
(Embretson & Reise, 2000).
I also suggest using the proposed dynamic Thurstonian IRT
model not only for measurement purposes but also more broadly as
an analytical framework for motivational research using the PSE.
In particular, dynamic Thurstonian IRT models could be useful in
research that investigates general motivational processes by ma-
nipulating characteristics of PSE sessions or pictures between
persons. For instance, picture-order effects could systematically be
studied by varying the order of pictures (e.g., Reitman & Atkinson,
1958). A potential advantage of such a design would be that
researchers could study how picture effects are influenced when
pictures are used at different positions in the PSE and that one
could investigate how the mean arousal of motives changes over
time for the entire sample. When this information is of interest, a
design of this type could yield interesting insights. For the purpose
of measuring individual differences in implicit motives using
dynamic Thurstonian IRT models, however, there are potential
disadvantages to such a design, and I accordingly do not recom-
mend routinely altering the order of pictures between persons. One
potential disadvantage is that position may be an additional fixed-
or random-effect source of variance in the dynamic Thurstonian
model that needs to be controlled and either makes the model more
complex or increases the error variance (Debeer & Janssen, 2013).
A second potential disadvantage of manipulating the order of
pictures is that it likely makes the estimation of the model more
difficult because a picture on which all persons work without
previous dynamic changes would be missing and the number of
combinations of pictures with different stages of the dynamic
process (Verhelst & Glas, 1993) would be larger such that less
information for each combination would be available (cf. Kolen &
Brennan, 2004).
A practical question for future research is how PSE researchers
could apply the dynamic Thurstonian model that I have described
to PSE data that differ from the Gurin et al. (1957) study. One
frequent data structure in PSE research that differs from the Gurin
et al. data is data with multiple ratings of each response. The
standard approach in large educational testing programs (Bock,
Brennan, & Muraki, 2002; Haladyna & Rodriguez, 2013; Houston,
Raymond, & Svec, 1991), a conceptually and statistically correct
one (cf. Bock et al., 2002), is to take the average of the raters. This
approach is also generally recommended and used in the multilevel
literature (e.g., Geldhof, Preacher, & Zyphur, 2014; LeBreton &
Senter, 2008). A disadvantage of taking the average is that this
approach likely results in undecided scores. Thurstonian model are
generally capable of dealing with undecided scores (cf. Critchlow
& Fligner, 1991), but models become considerably more complex.
A good and recommended alternative may therefore be to sum-
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marize responses from the rating level to the response level by
asking raters to reach a consensus (Haladyna & Rodriguez, 2013,
p. 258; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007) or by letting a third rater
evaluate ratings on which the initial two raters did not agree.
Another question for future research is whether the dynamic
Thurstonian IRT approach I described could possibly be extended
to allow researchers to study how raters deviate from the average
rating by incorporating multiple ratings of the same behavior into
an IRT model (Johnson, Sinharay, & Bradlow, 2006; Mariano &
Junker, 2007; Patz, Junker, Johnson, & Mariano, 2002). For other
commonly used IRT models, Patz et al. (2002) developed an
extension—the hierarchical rater model—that allows researchers
to study how raters deviate from the rating average and that does
not suffer from conceptual problems of earlier approaches (John-
son et al., 2006; Mariano & Junker, 2007). Future research could
explore whether and how a conceptually similar approach could be
developed for Thurstonian IRT models.
Conclusion
In this article, I have described a dynamic Thurstonian IRT
model of the response process in the PSE. This research suggests
that the classic PSE estimates reliable motive scores for the im-
plicit affiliation, power, and achievement motives on the basis of
a PSE session. Research employing PSE measures that are similar
to the PSE measure in the empirical study I reanalyzed is likely
based on a valid model of individual differences in implicit mo-
tives.
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